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JOSEPH C. SWEENEY
Compromise Provisions Regarding In Rem
Procedures
The Hamburg Convention of March 1978 was the culmination of
eight years of efforts in UNCITRAL to modernize the international
rules on carriage of goods by sea. The earlier 1924 Convention (The
Hague Rules) 1 did not have provisions respecting the validity of bill
of lading clauses restricting the place for legal action. There were
references in the 1924 Convention to liability of "the ship" which
presupposed the continuation of national rules establishing liability
in rem of the vessel upon which the goods had been damaged 2 (as
well as the liability in personam of the carrier) but the Convention
did not directly address the question of the separate liability of the
vessel. Among the many provisions of the 1976 UNCITRAL Draft
Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea 3 and of the 1978 Hamburg
Convention are important rules dealing with places where such ac-
tions may be brought.
These UNCITRAL provisions had emerged from comparative
law analysis and policy-based compromises during the long prepara-
tory period of the Draft Convention. In the UNCITRAL discussions,
consideration was given to the viewpoints of shipowner States
which sought either a very narrow base of jurisdiction over the car-
rier at his principal place of business or a place designated in the
carrier's printed bill of lading clauses. In response, shipper or cargo-
owning States drew attention to national case law and legislation in-
validating bill of lading clauses that forbade recourse to courts other
than a specified forum (such as the carrier's principal place of busi-
ness) 4 and sought provisions assuring a wider range of choices for
1. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating
to Bills of Lading, 25 August 1924, 51 Stat. 233 (1924), T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155, II
U.N. Register of Trade Law Texts 142 (for full citations of this and other UNCITRAL
documents see Note "UNCITRAL Documents," Part I-C supra.)
2. Hague Rules art. IV (1): "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for
loss or damage arising or resulting from .... ." Cf. arts. IV(2), IV(5).
3. The text of the 1976 Draft Convention appears in UNCITRAL, Report on Ninth
Session (1976) (A/31/17), VII Yearbook 15-20 and is reprinted in 8 J. Marit. L. &
Comm. 267 (1977). The Report of the Secretary-General prior to the first substantive
session in February 1972 contains an excellent study of all the jurisdictional
problems. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN. 9/63/ Add. 1 (1972), III Yearbook 263 at 275-287.
4. Examples of choice-of-forum clauses in bills of lading, and of national legisla-
tion and case law dealing with such clauses, appear in the Report of the Secretary-
General, n. 3 supra, III Yearbook 273-275 and 277-279.
The issue respecting validity of choice-of-law clauses in bills of lading is sharply
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legal action. From these conflicting views, a great compromise on ju-
risdiction was achieved: contract clauses could not bar the plaintiff
from suit at a limited list of places related to the contract or to the
performance of the carriage. This basic compromise was carried for-
ward into the Hamburg Rules as Art. 21(1), which provides:
1. In judicial proceedings relating to carriage of goods
under this Convention the plaintiff, at his option, may insti-
tute an action in a court which, according to the law of the
State where the court is situated, is competent and within
the jurisdiction of which is situated one of the following
places:
(a) the principal place of business or, in the absence
thereof, the habitual residence of the defendant; or
(b) the place where the contract was made provided
that the defendant has there a place of business, branch or
agency through which the contract was made; or
divided in worldwide jurisprudence. The problem centers on the language of art. III
(8) of the Hague Rules (46 U.S.C. 1303 (8)) which provides as follows: "Any clause,
covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from
liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising from negli-
gence, fault or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section, or lessen-
ing such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter shall be null and void
and of no effect ......
A 1955 decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had dismissed, as against
the presumed validity of the jurisdictional clause, an argument based on COGSA
1303(8) and held that jurisdictional clauses would be valid unless the shipper proves
the clause unreasonable. Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line, 224 F.2d 806
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied 350 U.S. 903 (1955). This decision was in line with that court's
earlier decision in Kloeckner Reederei und Kohlenhandel G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal,
210 F.2d 754 (2nd Cir. 1954), cert. dis. 348 U.S. 801 (1955), discounting the argument
that the possibility of different and unfavorable results in another forum should influ-
ence the decision of an American court, on a motion to dismiss for forum non con-
veniens reasons, where both parties were foreign. Subsequently, -the Fifth Circuit
took an approach to jurisdiction which conflicted with that of the Second Circuit in
Muller and Kloeckner. In 1967 the Second Circuit reconsidered the 1955 Muller deci-
sion and specifically overruled it, Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir.
1967): The court held that the jurisdictional clause in question had the effect of les-
sening the carrier's liability in accordance with COGSA 1303(8) and was thereby ren-
dered invalid. For a general discussion of the earlier aspects of the problem, see
Yiannopoulos, Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of Lading 110-22 (1962). Recent
cases invalidating a jurisdiction clause because of 46 U.S.C. 1303(8) are Roach v.
Hapag-Lloyd, 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1973) and No. Assurance Co. Ltd. v. M/V
Caspian Carrier, 1977 A.M.C. 421 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
The decision in M/S Bremen and Unterweser Reederei G.M.B.H. v. Zapata Off-
shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) is important for the general approval of the validity of ne-
gotiated arbitration provisions in international business transactions, but the
document involved in that case was clearly not a bill of lading with its attendant pub-
lic policy restrictions on freedom of contract. See generally, Nadelmann, "Choice of
Law Clauses in the United States, The Road to Zapata," 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 124 (1973)
and Wilner, "Judicially Assisted Dispute Resolution: Choice of Judicial or Arbitral
Forum Clauses," in 1975 Ford. Corp. L. Inst. 235 (1975; "International Project Financ-
ing," Sweeney ed.)
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(c) the port of loading or the port of discharge; or
(d) any additional place designated for that purpose in
the contract of carriage by sea.
This compromise rejected the position that there should be no
limit on access to courts that would accept suit. On the other hand,
paragraph (c) assures cargo interests that bill of lading clauses
would not bar action at "(c) the port of loading or the port of dis-
charge." The reference to the port of discharge was bitterly re-
sented by the shipowner States, but cargo-owning States insisted on
this option, and there seemed no adequate answer to their point
that cargo damage was usually discovered at the port of discharge.
It will be noted that, under paragraph (1) of Art. 21, the limited
list of alternative places where the plaintiff could institute judicial
proceedings did not include the place where the plaintiff might se-
cure the arrest of a ship owned or operated by the carrier. The sub-
ject matter of this article is the preservation of existing procedures
for jurisdiction based on arrest of the vessel, with special reference
to in rem process to enforce a shipper's maritime lien in the vessel
on which the goods were damaged.
IMPORTANCE OF IN REM PROCEDURES
Today it is generally true that plaintiffs in civil litigation must
run the risk of the death, bankruptcy or other disappearance of the
defendant or his assets during the lengthy conduct of pre-trial, trial
and post-trial maneuvers. There are however two general excep-
tions to this rule in civil litigation. One is pre-trial attachment of
property, where there is a danger of the defendant absconding. A
second exception is the commencement of the action against a de-
fendant by seizure of the defendant's property where the defendant
cannot be found within the jurisdiction--often termed an action
quasi in rem. In litigation in admiralty however it may also be pos-
sible for one who holds a special property interest in the ship-a
maritime lien-to obtain security during the entire proceeding by a
pre-trial seizure of the vessel which is the subject of the suit.
Many nations have some form of procedure which permits ar-
rest or attachment of a vessel, usually to prevent concealment of as-
sets, or to provide a basis for jurisdiction where the defendant is not
present or for detention at the behest of government. But there are
now few nations which retain the special process "in rem" against
the vessel as defendant, as contrasted with actions "quasi in rem,"
where the carrier is defendant.5
5. Sorely needed in this area of the law is a comparative law study of in rem
procedures. When the author was in private practice he often observed the arrest of
vessels in a world-wide admiralty practice by a number of jurisdictions which would
19791
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Efforts in the Comit6 Maritime International by shipowners to
"harmonize" and "unify" the maritime law by eliminating the lien
for cargo damage have combined with efforts of lending institutions
to reduce the number of claims which are prior in right to the ship
mortgage.
In view of the multinational, virtually homeless character of the
shipping industry, the in rem procedure offers the opportunity of a
convenient forum for injured passengers, crewmen, longshoremen,
collision victims, salvors and damaged-cargo owners. While the
wrong may occasionally occur near the defendant's home port or
corporate headquarters, the mobility of vessels makes it likely that
the exact place of accident will be fortuitous. As a result, claimants
need to take advantage of the temporary presence of the vessel if
their rights are ever to be enforced. Going beyond this general pol-
icy-based justification is the peculiar position of the U.S. as the ma-
jor world trader. As long as roughly 95% of U.S. foreign trade, by
volume, is carried in foreign flag vessels there is no doubt that the
U.S. will continue to need the use of in rem process. What is said
for the U.S. of course applies to other important shipper nations
such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada-nations which also
share the traditional admiralty doctrines of England.
As noted above, a prerequisite to the use of in rem process is
that the claimant be the holder of a maritime lien in the defendant
vessel.6 Unlike a mortgage, the maritime lien does not arise by the
will of the parties but originates out of certain types of occurrences:
a maritime tort or the breach of a maritime contract or a salvage act.
Such facts create in the claimant a property right in the vessel that
was involved in the occurrence that gives rise to the claim.
IN REM PROCESS: ORIGINS AND STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES
It is possible that the in rem process is merely the result of judi-
cial engineering by eighteenth and nineteenth century practitioners
not be counted as States with in rem procedures. The International Bar Association
has published Arrest of Vessels (Hagberg ed. 1976), vol. I in its series on maritime
law. Unhappily, many of the descriptive articles do not include citations to statutes
and decisions; consequently the work is' somewhat impractical for maritime lawyers,
although it may be useful for management and insurer's purposes. The volume does
not distinguish between arrest for the purposes of in rem process or arrest for protec-
tive purposes (saisie conservatoire).
6. See generally M.W. Zack Metal Co. v. International Navigation Co., 510 F.2d
451 (5th Cir. 1975) and Todd Shipyards Corp. v. City of Athens, 83 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md.
1949). See also The Bold Buccleugh, 13 Eng. Rep. 884 (P.C. 1851); and Gilmore &
Black, The Law of Admiralty 590-591 (2d ed. 1975); Ryan, "Admiralty Jurisdiction and
the Maritime Lien: an Historical Perspective," 7 West. Ontario L. Rev. 173 (1968);
Herbert, "Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens," 4 Tul. L. Rev. 381 (1930) and Price,
The Law of Maritime Liens (1940).
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at the admiralty bar in England and the U.S.7 Possibly it is not one
of the hoary traditions of the Rhodians, the Romans or the Maritime
Codes. The important point to note is that today there is no uni-
formity of view in the legal systems of the world concerning this fa-
vorite weapon of admiralty lawyers. Nevertheless, there is a
sufficient number of instances in the Laws of Visby (circa 1250
A.D.) 8 in which there seems to be a personification of the vessel be-
ing charged with certain costs and expenditures to argue that the al-
most legendary maritime codes of the past presupposed the
existence of in rem process.9
For present purposes we may leave the origin of in rem process
to historians. In any event, by 1860 the U.S. Supreme Court had rec-
ognized that owners of damaged cargo could use in rem process
against the vessel causing the damage, and based such process on
the view that every valid claim for cargo loss or damage created a
maritime lien against the ship.'0 Then in 1868 the Court in The
China gave theoretical and practical justification for in rem process
based on the claimant's need for an effective basis for recovery."
Further explanation of the nature of in rem process was provided in
the opinion of Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Hughes in Rounds v.
Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co.' 2 In upholding the constitutional-
ity of a state court attachment of a vessel under the "Saving to Suit-
7. An early American admiralty text, Hall, The Practice and Jurisdiction of the
Court of Admiralty (1809), translating the English authority (in latin), Clerke's
Praxis Supremeae Curiae Admiralitatis, states (60-1) in commenting on in rem proc-
ess that, "This proceeding is in the nature of the process of foreign attachments
under the custom of London, which has been introduced into most, if not all of the
States with great advantage and success. Its object is to compel the appearance of an
absent or absconding debtor and in the case he does not appear to satisfy the debt
out of his effects and credits."
8. E.g. The Laws of Visby (Translated in 30 Fed. Cas. 1189) art. XXVI: "If a ship
riding at anchor in a harbor is struck by another ship which runs against her, driven
by the wind or current, and the ship so struck receives damage, either in her bulk or
cargo, the two ships shall jointly stand to the loss; ..... " See also arts. XVIII, XLIV,
L, LXVII and LXX.
9. There is an analogy between in rem process and the historic bottomry bond.
See generally, The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (Wall.) 129 (1870) and Detroit Trust Co. v. The
Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934) which contrast the bottomry bond with the pre-
ferred ship mortgage.
10. Bulkley v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 386 (1860).
11. The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868). The China, a British steam vessel out-
bound from New York under the conn of a compulsory pilot, collided with and sank
an inbound brig. The compulsory pilot was 100% at fault so the steam vessel owners
urged no liability either in personam or in rem since there was no basis for respon-
deat superior. The Supreme Court noted that the pilots would undoubtedly be judg-
ment-proof and therefore the remedy of the damaged vessel would be a mere
delusion if there were no maritime lien resulting in an in rem liability of the vessel.
Accordingly, "... the collision impresses upon the wrongdoing vessel a maritime
lien."
12. 237 U.S. 303 (1915).
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ors Clause,"'1 3 as against the assertion that attachment of vessels is
exclusively the prerogative of admiralty process, the opinion
stated:14
The proceeding in rem which is within the exclusive juris-
diction of admiralty is one essentially against the vessel it-
self as the debtor or offending thing,-in which the vessel is
itself "seized and impleaded as the defendant and is adjudg-
ed and sentenced accordingly." By virtue of dominion over
the thing all persons interested in it are deemed to be par-
ties to the suit; the decree binds all the world and under it
the property itself passes, and not merely the title or inter-
est of a personal defendant....
Over the years, much has been written on the distinctions be-
tween the "procedural" theory of in rem in the U.K. and the "per-
sonification" theory in the U.S. In spite of theoretical differences,
there is little practical difference. Under the modern English proce-
dural theory15 the in rem process is used (as it is said) to hold the
ship to ransom - that is, to force the shipowner to appear person-
ally and defend. The American theory relies on a concept of person-
ification to hold the ship herself liable for certain torts and contracts
committed under conditions which justify the payment of damages
when the shipowner may not be subject to personal service or, more
importantly, even though the shipowner may not be liable under
traditional common law principles.' 6
One of the most important practical consequences of in rem
process against the ship is to make the owner's interest in a
chartered ship available for the satisfaction of a maritime claim
even though the claim arose while the ship was operated by the
charterer. The theoretical justification can be sought in Gilmore and
Black's analysis of the conflicting cases:' 7
To a nineteenth century court it would have seemed strange
to hold the subjectively innocent shipowner liable without
limitation (i.e., in personam) for torts committed while the
charterer was in control of the ship. The conclusion that the
shipowner should be held to a liability limited to his inter-
13. § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1).
14. 237 U.S. at 306.
15. The differences between these concepts may possibly be due to the destruc-
tion of the historic Doctors' Commons in London in the mid-nineteenth century
which resulted in the absorption of Common-law (as opposed to Civil-law) concepts
in cases tried by Common lawyers in admiralty. See Wiswall, Development of Admi-
ralty Jurisdiction and Practice since the Eighteenth Century (1970); I British Ship-
ping Laws, Admiralty Practice, by McGuffie, Fugeman and Gray (1964).
16. See Note, "Personification of Vessels," 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1122 (1964). See also
Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 586-622 (2d Ed. 1975).
17. Gilmore & Black at 621-2.
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est in the ship through in rem process may be looked on as
an instinctive adjustment of theory to reality. In our cen-
tury we have become accustomed to the idea of liability, in-
deed unlimited liability, without fault -. . . Abandonment
of the agreeable fiction of ship's personality will have been
bought at far too high a price if twentieth century shipown-
ers are to be absolved of liability for the tortious uses to
which their ships are put by third parties to whom they
have entrusted control ....
Arrest of vessels (either in rem or quasi in rem), like various
other types of proceedings involving the seizure of assets, has been
challenged on the ground that the defendant is deprived of the use
of property prior to an opportunity for a judicial determination of
the claim. 18 Such challenges under the Due Process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution turn on
the adequacy and speed of the applicable procedures, and should
not undermine the substantive rights protected by in rem process.
Fortunately, work is under way to assure that arrest procedures will
comply with constitutional guarantees. 19
18. The in rem process is alleged to violate due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment because there is no notice to the holder of the chattel and no provision
for a hearing on the merits of the claim before the holder is deprived of the chattel.
In Techem Chemical Co. v. M/T Choyo Maru, 416 F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1976) the court
discusses the problem without deciding it. Dictum supports the in rem procedures in
East Asiatic Co. Ltd. v. SS Indomar, 1976 A.M.C. 2039. Admiralty attachments of
funds are involved in two recent cases, one holding the attachment unconstitutional,
Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Canadian Transport Agencies, Ltd., 1978 A.M.C.
789 (W.D. Wash. 1978) the other holding it to be constitutional, Engineering Equip-
ment Co. v. S.S. Selene, 1978 A.M.C. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
19. The Maritime Law Association of the United States has proposed amend-
ments to the Supplemental Rules to provide for a hearing to be granted forthwith
where property is arrested. See MLA Doc. No. 605 at pp. 6637-6644 (1977).
In rem process is significantly different from the procedures that have been held
unconstitutional. See Calero Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)
where the Puerto Rico police began an in rem seizure of a yacht under a statute per-
mitting confiscation of vehicles used for unlawful purposes, in this case, transporting
a small quantity of marijuana. The three judge court held the statute unconstitu-
tional on the basis of Fuentes v, Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that there was no due process violation because of the extraordinary
situation wherein pre-seizure notice and hearing might frustrate the public interest
since the property might be removed or concealed or destroyed. See also U.S. v. One
1972 Wood 19 ft. custom boat FL 844 3AY, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974).
Other analogies, further removed, involve that of summary seizure of aircraft by
the Federal Aviation Authority under statutory authority to prevent violations of
safety statutes; See Aircrane v. Butterfield, 369 F. Supp. 598 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Less
analogous summary seizures provided by statute are found in Erving v. Mytinger &
Casselberry, 399 U.S. 594 (1950) (misbranded drugs); Faheley v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947) (bank failure); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921) (war material);
North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated food); and
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (internal revenue collections).
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DRAFTING THE UNCITRAL TEXT
As has been mentioned, ocean carriers have sought to solve ju-
risdictional problems by contract; for example, bill of lading clauses
often provide that any litigation arising out of the carriage may only
be brought in the courts of the principal place of business of the car-
rier. The 1924 Convention ("Hague Rules") does not deal directly
with the validity of such clauses and national case law and legisla-
tion on this question are in sharp conflict; thus there were strong
reasons for an international solution.
Case law in the U.S. has tended to invalidate such jurisdiction
clauses on the ground that they erected barriers to the full realiza-
tion of the substantive rights of the cargo-owners protected by the
1924 Convention.20 Consequently, the U.S. delegation feared that
any international legislation on the subject could only restrict the
cargo owner's existing rights in the U.S., and that very delicate com-
promises would have to be achieved in order for the new rules to be-
come acceptable to both cargo-owning and carrier nations.
A Secretariat Study presented to the UNCITRAL Working
Group analyzed alternative approaches to jurisdiction in cargo dam-
age cases that might be followed in the new Convention:2 1 (1) No
provision on jurisdiction, in accordance with the existing Hague
Rules; (2) a provision prohibiting all forum selection clauses; (3) a
provision prohibiting those forum selection clauses which evidence
abuse of economic power or the use of unfair means; (4) a provision
on jurisdiction following the examples of other international trans-
port conventions, especially the Warsaw Convention, The European
Road and Rail Conventions, and the Passenger Luggage Convention.
To illustrate the fourth alternative, the Secretariat prepared al-
ternative draft proposals. One of these (Draft Proposal A) assured
the plaintiff of specified alternative places for suit related to the lo-
cation of the parties and the salient events in the making and per-
formance of the contract of carriage, including the place of loading
and the place of discharge. This approach, embodied in paragraph A
of the Draft Proposal, attracted widespread support and was embod-
ied in art. 21(1) of the Hamburg Rules, quoted above.
To implement the compromise that the plaintiff would be af-
forded adequate but not unlimited alternatives, paragraph B of the
Draft Proposal provided as follows:
No legal proceedings arising out of the contract of carriage
may be brought in a place not specified in paragraph A
above.
20. See e.g., Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) and related
cases cited in n. 4 supra.
21. See Report of The Secretary-General, III Yearbook 277-278 (paras. 86-96).
[Vol. 27
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In spite of the wide support for Draft Proposal A, the U.S.
pointed out that paragraph B of the Draft Proposal, which forbade
the commencement of legal proceedings in any place not specified
in paragraph A, would bar proceedings at the place of arrest of the
offending vessel when arrest occurred at a place not specified in par-
agraph A. Consequently, the U.S. argued that the criteria selected
for jurisdiction of cargo disputes were fatally insufficient and that
the omission of a provision for some sort of in rem jurisdiction was a
defect that must be remedied. The choices for the United States in
a future convention would be at best an attempt at a reservation to
the jurisdictional portion of the convention or at worst a failure to
ratify because of the strong public policy in favor of retention of in
rem jurisdiction in the U.S., especially in cargo damage cases. 22
The U.S. at first proposed simply the addition of the place of in
rem jurisdiction to the list of available jurisdictions in paragraph A
of the Draft Proposal. This proposal encountered considerable op-
position on the ground that the plaintiff might subject the ship to in
rem process at a remote port that bore no relationship to the con-
tract of carriage or its performance. Consequently it was urged that
permitting litigation at any place where the ship might be arrested
would be inconsistent with the basic compromise offered by para-
graph A. Under this compromise, the shipper is freed from bill of
lading clauses which often required that claims be brought at a
place that was convenient only for the carrier, while the authorized
places are restricted to those related to the contract of carriage or its
performance.
To meet this objection, the U.S. proposed to add a second provi-
sion to permit the defendant to require the plaintiff to remove the
action to one of the jurisdictional sites specified in paragraph A; the
removal would be conditioned on the defendant's providing ade-
quate security. Since there was no way for the transferee State to
determine adequacy, the transferor State would be permitted to de-
termine the adequacy of security.
These changes produced some additional support, but not
enough for real consensus. The U.S. therefore made a further pro-
posal-that the in rem remedy could be used only where the vessel
could be properly attached in accordance with the local'law.
It was suggested that any special provision for in rem jurisdic-
tion would be inconsistent with the approach of the air and rail con-
ventions. The U.S. argued that these analogies were not appropriate
in view of the nature of the permanent installations for rail transpor-
22. The debate in UNCITRAL is reported in some detail in Sweeney, "The UNCI-
TRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part I)," 7 J. Marit. L. &
Comm. 69, 77-84 (1975).
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tation and the bilateral agreements and guarantees supporting air
transport. The U.S. pointed out that its proposals did not give as
much effect to in rem process as does current law in the U.S. since,
under current law, in rem process could lead to adjudication on the
merits in the U.S. even though the carriage had not had the contact
with the U.S. required under art. 21(1) of the Hamburg Rules. The
delegation had to face the possibility that further weakening of in
rem process would be attacked at home as an unnecessary surren-
der of an essential principle.23
These various compromises and adjustments led to the addition
to art. 21 of the Hamburg Rules of the following two paragraphs:
2. (a) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this
article, an action may be instituted in the courts of any port
or place in a Contracting State at which the carrying vessel
or any other vessel of the same ownership may have been
arrested in accordance with applicable rules of the law of
that State and of international law. However, in such a case,
at the petition of the defendant, the claimant must remove
the action, at his choice, to one of the jurisdictions referred
to in paragraph 1 of this article for the determination of the
claim, but before such removal the defendant must furnish
security sufficient to ensure payment of any judgement that
may subsequently be awarded to the claimant in the action.
(b) All questions relating to the sufficiency or other-
wise of the security shall be determined by the court of the
port or place of the arrest.
3. No judicial proceedings relating to carriage of goods
under this Convention may be instituted in a place not spec-
ified in paragraph 1 or 2 of this article. The provisions of
this paragraph do not constitute an obstacle to the jurisdic-
tion of the Contracting States for provisional or protective
measures.
23. There were no major changes at the Second Reading of the text. At the UN-
CITRAL Plenary Commission in 1976, the compromise "in rem" provision was pre-
served and even enlarged, after an extensive debate, in that a provision regarding
quasi in rem jurisdiction over sister ships which had been summarily rejected in 1972
was accepted on the arguments put forward by Singapore. The Soviet Union sought
an amendment whereby State-owned vessels could never be subjected to in rem
process, but this was rejected on the ground that since the vessels must have been
legally arrested in accordance with the law of the arresting State and that while some
States recognized the immunity of State-owned vessels, many did not, it would be
overly ambitious to attempt to resolve that problem in this Convention. Sweeney,
"The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part V)," 8 J. Marit.
L. & Comm. 167, 184-192 (1977).
Respecting the question of the absence of immunity because of the commercial
nature of State-owned merchant ships, see generally Philippine Admiral (Owners) v.
Wallen Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd. & another, [19761 2 W.L.R. 214 (P.C.).
[Vol. 27
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It is believed that these provisions are the product of compara-
tive law analysis and refinement rather than an adoption of the
views of any single delegation.
LEGISLATING THE JURISDICTIONAL ARTICLE AT HAMBURG
Despite the lengthy preparatory work of UNCITRAL on art. 21,
its controversial nature guaranteed that much time would be spent
on this article at the Diplomatic Conference in Hamburg in March
1978. In fact parts of three sessions were devoted to the considera-
tion of twenty proposed amendments beginning with the unsuccess-
ful proposal of the Soviet Union to delete the entire article.
State-owned Vessels
One of the more significant issues involved the immunity of
state-owned ships. At the UNCITRAL Plenary it had been proposed
that state-owned ships be given immunity from arrest. This propo-
sal was found objectionable because of concern by non-socialist
States lest the proposed immunity would be applicable to merchant
ships engaged in ordinary commercial service. At the Hamburg
Conference, instead of renewing this debate, the Soviet Union pro-
posed that it was not enough that a vessel be arrested in accordance
with the domestic law of the arresting State but that the arrest must
also be in accord with the principles of international law. This prop-
osition was quickly supported by Norway, the United States, the
Federal Republic of Germany, India, Belgium, France and Algeria.
Since there was no opposition, the text of art. 21 (2) as prepared by
UNCITRAL was amended to insert a new phrase, "in accordance
with applicable rules of the law of that State and of international
law" to replace the earlier formulation, "in accordance with the ap-
plicable law of that State." Obviously opinions varied as to what in-
ternational law may or may not say on the matter.
Removal Procedures
Another significant issue was a proposal that the art. 21 (2) (a)
provision for removal of the case to one of the art. 21(1) jurisdictions
chosen by the claimant be changed so that the art. 21(1) jurisdiction
would be chosen by the shipowner. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many, supported by Belgium, Singapore and Liberia, urged the dele-
tion of the removal provision in art. 21(2)(a) because of
incompatibility with the 1952 Arrest of Ships Convention 2 4 and al-
24. II U.N. Register of Trade Law Texts 156, 439 U,N.T.S. 195. It is not feasible to
deal fully with this convention here. The U.S. is not a party to it. The 1952 Conven-
tion compromises traditional Anglo-American concepts of jurisdiction in rem with
French Civil Code concepts of the defendant's right to be sued at his domicile. (See
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leged impracticality of international removal of actions. Both pro-
posals were defeated; the prevailing view was that such changes
would undermine the delicate balance between economic interests
reflected in the UNCITRAL compromise. 25
CONCLUSION
Under the new Hamburg Rules the owner of damaged cargo
may always elect to bring his legal action at one of the fora desig-
nated in art. 21(1). Where experience has indicated to the claimant
that something more serious must be done to prevent a carrier from
ignoring a claim, the cargo owner may attempt a traditional in rem
action against the ship or the more widely available arrest quasi in
rem where such procedures are permitted by statute or decisional
law. Often it is the seizure (or the threat of seizure) which is the
most important part of the arrest process, since rapid and fruitful
settlement discussions will usually occur when the carrier appreci-
ates that he is dealing with a non-frivolous claimant who can disrupt
his entire vessel operation. If it appears that there are genuine is-
sues of fact and law that will require litigation it will then be possi-
ble for the defending carrier to request removal of the case from the
generally, Weser, "Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries,"
10 Am J. Comp. L. 323 (1961)). Under the latter view, the maritime claim must be
brought against the defendant in personam, unless the defendant is not present
within the jurisdiction; in this case arrest of the vessel will be authorized and may
lead to a judgment for the full amount of the claim. Art. 7 of the 1952 Convention
gives the courts of the country in which an arrest is made jurisdiction to determine
the case upon its merits if the domestic law of the country in which the arrest is
made gives jurisdiction to such courts. A special class of cases permits a decision on
the merits where the claimant has his principal place of business or habitual resi-
dence in the arresting State, where the claim arose in the arresting State, where the
claim concerns the very voyage during which the arrest was made and other cases
not here relevant. The compromise nature of the 1952 Convention surfaces in its very
name: the English language version uses the term "arrest of vessels" (the end result
of either in rem or quasi in rem process) while the French name "saisie conserva-
toire" refers to emergency protective measures. The Hamburg Rules do not require
courts of contracting States to arrest and do not enlarge the cargo claimant's rights
under the 1952 Convention, but may in fact restrict them since cases which under the
1952 Convention might be decided on the merits in the arresting court must now be
removed at the petition of the shipowner to one of the jurisdictions listed in art. 21(1)
of the Hamburg Rules. For a full discussion of the 1952 Convention, see Kriz, "Ship
Mortgages, Maritime Liens, and their Enforcement: The Brussels Conventions of
1926 and 1952," 1963 Duke L.J. 671 and 1964 Duke L.J. 70; Ripert, "Les Conventions de
Bruxelles du 10 mai 1952 sur 1' Unification du Droit Maritime," [1952] Droit Maritime
Francais 343.
25. The vote on the proposal to delete the removal provision was: In favor, 8; op-
posed, 33; abstentions, 21.
The U.S. was also able to secure a clarifying amendment, strongly favored by the
United States Maritime Law Association, to refer to arrest in "any port or place in a
Contracting State." The emphasized language was added to make sure that the ar-
rest provisions would apply if ships are arrested in territorial waters that are outside
the "port" area.
[Vol. 27
1979] SWEENEY: IN REM PROCEDURES 419
arresting jurisdiction to one of the fora listed in art. 21(1). Guaran-
tees to prevent misuse of the removal provisions, however, are also
part of the new scheme. As we have seen, security sufficient to the
arresting court must be posted. And the removal of the action will
not be time-barred since (by virtue of art. 21(4) (c)) the receiving
court, if a contracting party to the Convention, will not consider the
removal of the action to be the commencement of a new action.
The work of the UNCITRAL drafters and the spirit of compro-
mise which prevailed at Hamburg have preserved a most useful pro-
cedure for future development in cargo damage actions arising
under the new Hamburg Rules. Although various aspects of the
compromise were opposed on theoretical or policy-based grounds by
groups that, together, comprised a majority of participants at UNCI-
TRAL and possibly at Hamburg, the compromise "package" was ac-
cepted by the diplomatic conference. Thus the U.S. was able to
preserve the essence of in rem process to meet the needs of its for-
eign trade as a cargo-owning nation.
The work of UNCITRAL in providing a forum for intellectual
resolution, in a spirit of scientific cooperation, of these complex
problems of maritime jurisdiction has demonstrated its permanent
value for the future in the progressive development and harmoniza-
tion of international trade law.

